TRA Studio
Alle Beispieldokumente

Die Beispieldokumente und Projektpläne sind bewusst nur auf Englisch veröffentlicht: Sie sind Vorlagen zum Übernehmen, und eine Übersetzung wäre nicht die Fassung, mit der Sie am Ende arbeiten.

Fiktives Beispiel. Die ACME Embedded GmbH, ihre Produkte, Nachweise und Dokument-IDs sind zur Veranschaulichung erfunden. Nutzen Sie das als strukturelles Vorbild, nicht als unverändert zu übernehmende Vorlage — und nicht als Rechtsberatung.

SEC-RA-S300 — Product Cybersecurity Risk Assessment (Pre-Development Version)

Document IDSEC-RA-S300, version 0.1 (pre-development baseline)
ProductSensorNode S300 (project P-2026-04)
ReferenceCRA Annex I I(1); method per SDL-TMP-010; input to threat model SEC-TM-S300
Prepared byProduct Security Lead, 2026-07-10
Reviewed byTeam Lead Firmware, QA Engineer
Versioning ruleAll versions are retained in the QM repository. This v0.1 is a fixed part of the technical documentation (Annex VII) and must never be overwritten — updates create v0.2, v1.0 (release), etc.

1. Method

Risk = Likelihood (1–4) × Impact (1–4), assessed against the Annex I Part I security properties. Scales and acceptance thresholds per SDL-TMP-010: risk ≥ 9 requires a design measure; 4–8 requires a documented decision; ≤ 3 acceptable. Assessment performed in a 2-hour workshop (PSL, firmware lead, QA, product manager) before any architecture decisions were frozen — that is the point: results below may still change the hardware selection and system design.

2. Security context and assumptions

  • Deployment: industrial halls; network = private 802.15.4 mesh to ACME Gateway G50; no direct internet exposure of the S300.
  • Physical access: devices mounted on machinery, reachable by on-site personnel; theft of a unit is plausible.
  • Data processed: vibration/temperature telemetry (low confidentiality), device credentials and network keys (high confidentiality), measurement history buffered locally up to 72 h.
  • Foreseeable misuse: re-pairing a stolen node to an attacker's gateway; use of the radio as an entry point into the mesh.

3. Risk register (pre-development)

IDThreat scenarioLIRiskDecision / derived requirement
R-01Network key extracted from stolen node's flash → mesh compromise3412Data-at-rest encryption + key storage in secure element or MCU key vault → feeds ENG-REC-032 (hardware feasibility)
R-02Malicious firmware installed via update channel248Signed updates with rollback protection (secure boot chain); requirement SR-S300-04
R-03Unauthenticated node joins the mesh / node impersonation339Per-device identity, authenticated join procedure; requirement SR-S300-05
R-04Debug interface (SWD/UART) used to dump firmware and secrets339Production fuse lock, no shell on UART → checklist SDL-CHK-030 items A3/A4
R-05Telemetry manipulation → wrong maintenance decisions at customer236Integrity protection on radio link (AEAD); documented decision D-2026-11
R-06DoS by radio jamming326Out of product scope (physical layer); detection + "stale data" flag at gateway; documented decision D-2026-12
R-07Vulnerable third-party stack (radio/crypto lib) during 7-year support period339Component policy SDL-POL-005 + EOL check ENG-REC-031 mandatory before component selection
R-08Local measurement buffer read from stolen device224Covered by R-01 measure (encrypted storage); no extra measure

4. Conclusions for pre-development

  1. Hardware selection is constrained by R-01: candidate MCUs without usable at-rest encryption/key storage are excluded (see ENG-REC-032).
  2. Four security requirements (SR-S300-01…05) enter the Security Requirements Sheet as mandatory before architecture freeze.
  3. R-07 makes the component policy and EOL screening a blocking pre-development task, not a later hygiene item.
  4. Support period target for S300: 7 years — all component decisions must hold against that horizon.

5. Version history

VersionDateStageNote
0.12026-07-10Pre-development baselineRetained unchanged as part of technical documentation
0.2 (planned)after architecture freezeUpdate with concrete design
1.0 (planned)release gateFinal assessment for DoC