How the example artifact on the other tab is produced: trigger, inputs, steps, and what "done" means. Guidance based on the CRA text — a starting point for your own process, not legal advice.
How it is created — SDL-STD-022 Support Period & Security Update Policy
| Produces | SDL-STD-022 — how long each product line is supported, and what a security update is obliged to be |
| Type | Company-level policy (per product line, not per product); the per-product end date is derived from it |
| Owner | Managing Director for the commercial commitment, Product Security Lead for the technical rules |
| Approves | Managing Director |
| Trigger | Before the first product is placed on the market — the support period must be known and published at purchase time; reviewed annually |
| CRA reference | Art. 13(8) (support period, determined before placing on market); Annex I I(2) and Part II (security updates: free of charge, without undue delay, separated from feature updates) |
1. What this commits you to
The support period is a promise with a cost. It fixes how long you must keep a branch buildable, patchable and signable — which in turn fixes toolchain, SDK and component choices made years earlier. This is why the EOL check and this policy have to agree: declaring seven years while shipping an SDK maintained for four is a compliance gap dressed as a marketing statement.
It is also the document a buyer reads. The end date has to be available at purchase time, so it is a commercial commitment before it is a technical one — which is why management, not engineering, owns the number.
2. Inputs
- The expected use time of each product line — installation lifecycles, maintenance contracts, how long units actually stay in the field. This is the CRA's yardstick, not a marketing preference.
- The EOL assessment for the components and toolchains behind each line: what can genuinely be patched to that horizon, and at what maintenance cost.
- Your update mechanism's real capabilities: signing, rollback protection, recovery, and whether air-gapped sites can be served at all.
- The vulnerability-handling process, whose remediation classes define what "without undue delay" means in days.
3. Steps
- Set the period per product line, not per product. A single number per line is maintainable; per-SKU exceptions are not. State the rationale — it is part of the technical documentation.
- Go above the floor where the field life demands it, and say why. Industrial installations outlive consumer devices; a declared period shorter than the realistic use time is the thing an authority will question.
- Write the deviation rule. Anything below five years needs a demonstrable justification and a named approver. Make that explicit, or it will happen implicitly.
- Say where the end date is published — user information, product page, technical documentation, available before purchase — and as what: a month and year, not "five years from release", which no customer can evaluate.
- Handle the awkward cases now, in writing: channel stock and RMA replacements placed on the market later, extensions bought via contract, and what happens at end of support. Extensions must never shorten the published baseline.
- Announce end-of-support long in advance — twelve months is a defensible norm — with a final security advisory and an unambiguous statement on the product page afterwards.
- Define what a security update is.* Free of charge, for every unit, without registration barriers; delivered on a separate patch line so a security fix never requires accepting new features, changed defaults or new terms.
- Write the inseparability exception before you need it: when a fix cannot be separated from a feature release, the advisory says so, the release notes split the content, and someone senior approves it. Without the exception you get silent non-compliance; without the conditions you get it routinely.
- Specify the distribution mechanism as security properties, not products: signed images with keys in an HSM, signature verification before install, anti-rollback counters, power-fail-safe A/B installation, TLS with pinning, and signed offline packages for air-gapped sites.
- State the default behaviour. Automatic security updates on by default where unattended restarts are acceptable; where the intended use forbids that, a prominent notification and a one-action opt-in — and record the risk acceptance in the release checklist.
- List the supported branches per product somewhere maintained, and give users on unsupported branches a free upgrade path.
4. Done when
- Every product line has a period, a rationale and a published end date in month/year form.
- The period is defensible against both the expected use time and the EOL assessment behind it.
- "Free of charge" and "separate from feature updates" are stated as rules, with the exception path and its approver.
- The update mechanism's integrity, anti-rollback and recovery properties are specified, not assumed.
- End-of-support has a notice period, a final advisory and a public statement.
- Management has signed a dated revision.
5. Common mistakes
Declaring a period the toolchain cannot survive. Publishing "5 years" without a date the buyer can read. Bundling security fixes into feature releases because the branch model makes anything else expensive — decide the branch model in favour of the obligation, not the other way round. Forgetting the units that leave the warehouse two years after launch. And treating end-of-support as a silent event.
6. In TRA Studio
The support period is the clock every post-release activity runs against. Record it on the product, model the update and advisory activities in the Secure Lifecycle, and assign the Annex I Part II update requirements to them — so "supported until 2033" is backed by activities with owners rather than by a sentence in a datasheet.
